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Abstract—Achieving ultra-reliable, low-latency and secure
communications is essential for realizing the industrial Internet
of Things (IIoT). Non-coherent massive multiple-input multiple-
output (MIMO) has recently been proposed as a promising
methodology to fulfill ultra-reliable and low-latency require-
ments. In addition, physical layer authentication (PLA) technol-
ogy is particularly suitable for IIoT communications thanks to
its low-latency attribute. A PLA method for non-coherent mas-
sive single-input multiple-output (SIMO) IIoT communication
systems is proposed in this paper. Specifically, we first determine
the optimal embedding of the authentication information (tag) in
the message information. We then optimize the power allocation
between message and tag signal to characterize the trade-off
between message and tag error performance. Numerical results
show that the proposed PLA is more accurate then traditional
methods adopting the uniform tag when the communication
reliability remains at the same level. The proposed PLA method
can be effectively applied to the non-coherent system.
I. INTRODUCTION
The fast development of the Internet of Things (IoT)
has promoted innovations in many fields. The application
of the IoT in the industrial sector, referred to as industrial
IoT (IIoT), has recently attracted tremendous attention from
researchers and engineers owing to its ability to improve
the efficiency and productivity of industry. Compared with
traditional industrial networks mainly based on wired cables,
wireless communications are more suitable for the IIoT due
to low maintenance expenditure, flexible deployment, and
higher long-term reliability [1]. However, ultra-reliable, low-
latency and secure requirements of the IIoT represent main
challenges for wireless design [2] [3]. Wireless channels suffer
from path-loss, shadowing, fading and interference, thus it is
very challenging to design wireless networks to achieve the
ultra-reliable transmission [4]. Moreover, the broadcast char-
acteristic of wireless channels makes the IIoT systems more
vulnerable to attacks [5]. Non-coherent massive multiple-
input multiple-output (MIMO) has recently been proposed
as a promising methodology to meet ultra-reliable and low-
latency requirements of IIoT communications [6], which uses
multiple receive antennas to reduce the effects of fading and
uncorrelated noise in wireless channels and boost system
reliability. Besides, non-coherent massive MIMO uses energy-
based modulation to achieve low latency by avoiding channel
estimation and by applying fast non-coherent detection [7] [8].
Two security services have been commonly considered in the
IIoT, including integrity and authenticity, which are essential in
IIoT systems. Message authentication code (MAC) is a preva-
lent mechanism to provide these two services. Conventional
systems realize message authentication by attaching a MAC
to the message and this authentication process is completed
above the physical layer [9], e.g., transport layer security
(TLS) protocol in the transport layer and Wi-Fi protected
access II (WPA2) protocol in the network layer. However,
these conventional mechanisms may not be able to meet the
stringent low-latency requirement of IIoT communications.
Because short packet transmission is one of the characteristics
of the IIoT, the transmission overhead for the MAC can be
large and excessive in the short packet transmission with
small payload, occurring relatively large delay. In addition, the
authentication process can only be completed after the data has
been transferred to upper layers, which leads to low efficiency.
Therefore, we aim to propose a message authentication method
at the physical layer which can also reduce transmission
overhead.
Physical layer security, according to its implementation
method, can be divided into two categories. The first category
is based on the information-theoretic approach, which was pro-
posed by Shannon [10] and further developed by Wyner with
the wiretap channel model [11]. This kind of approach only
guarantees data confidentiality by preventing eavesdropper
from understanding the information, but other security services
like data integrity and authenticity are not considered. The
second category is based on the signal and channel features,
which aims to provide authenticity and data integrity. In the
IIoT scenario, active attacks (e.g., modification, masquerade
or replay attack) are much more harmful than passive attacks
(e.g., eavesdropping) [12]. Therefore, we consider physical
layer authentication (PLA) from the perspective of the second
category. Existing PLA methods have two forms: passive and
active [13]. Passive PLA utilizes the intrinsic features of
communication systems to authenticate the transmitter, such
as radio signal strength indicator, channel state information
(CSI) and radio frequency fingerprints [5]. These features
were thoroughly analyzed in [14] with a theoretical model
and experimental validation. The results of [14] revealed that
the intrinsic features are not reliable in practical scenarios due
to the device mobility, wireless fading channels and indistin-
guishable RF fingerprints. In contrast, active PLA refers to the
methods in which the transmitter sends additional information
(normally referred to as tag) for authentication at the physical
layer. Active PLA features embedding a tag in the message
information and does not take extra time to transmit the tag.
Thanks to its potential to meet the low-latency requirement,
active PLA has advantages over conventional authentication
methods sending a message and its tag separately [15].
The key issue of implementing active PLA is how to embed
a tag in message information at the physical layer. Several
methods dealing with this issue have been published. The
tag was added as noise in [16]: different additional angle
offsets to normal quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK) indi-
cate different tag bits. 4/16 hierarchical quadrature amplitude
modulation (QAM) was applied in [17] to transmit a message
and its tag simultaneously, where a 4-QAM tag constellation is
superimposed on a 4-QAM message constellation. Challenge
response PLA was introduced in [18] and the authentication
information was embedded during a “challenge and response”
process. Although these active PLA methods transmit a tag
and a message at the same time, they all need to send separate
pilots for channel estimation to acquire the instantaneous CSI.
In [19], a tag is embedded in the original pilot to form a
new pilot, and the tag detection is completed by a correlation
operation. Then the new pilot signal is used to estimate CSI for
message recovery. Note that these existing active PLA methods
are not suitable for non-coherent massive MIMO-based IIoT
systems, in which no estimation of the instantaneous CSI is
performed. To our best knowledge, how to perform active PLA
for non-coherent systems is still an open problem.
As the first attempt to fill this gap, we focus on designing
an active PLA mechanism for non-coherent massive single-
input multiple-output (SIMO) IIoT systems. As elaborated in
[20], non-negative pulse amplitude modulation (PAM) is a
favorable scheme for the considered system. In the system,
the variance of the received signal power increases as the
transmitted signal amplitude increases. In this context, the
tag embedding constellation pattern is not necessary to be
uniform as in the existing methods, but needs to be optimized
according to the message constellation. The tag embedding
design becomes a nontrivial problem as the increased tag
signal power reduces the error rate of tag while increasing
the error rate of message, leading to the error performance
trade-off between message and tag. In this paper, we manage
to find an optimal 1-bit tag embedding design based on a
given message constellation. Then for a fixed average system
power, we attain the optimal power allocation of message and
tag signals to characterize the trade-off between message and
tag error performance, which can provide useful insights for
practical system design.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, we consider the PLA in a massive SIMO-
based IIoT communication system, where multiple sensors
transmit data to a controller with N antennas. Each sensor
has one single antenna and these sensors send data to the
controller with time-division multiple access (TDMA) manner.
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Fig. 1. Diagram of the PLA at the transmitter side.
An attacker is within the range of this wireless communication
system, who can receive the signal from sensors and send
malicious signals to the controller. To meet the low-latency
requirement of the IIoT, we adopt non-negative PAM at
the transmitter and non-coherent maximum likelihood (ML)
detector at the receiver [6]–[8]. Since only statistics of the
channel are needed in this method, the channel estimation
process is not required and the authentication can be executed
faster. To realize PLA, the transmitter embeds the tag signal in
the message signal at the physical layer, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
MAC is denoted by M , which is generated by message bits b
and secret key k with a hash function, and it is given by
M = hash(b, k). (1)
The modulated signal of b and M are denoted by m and t,
which are termed message signal and tag signal, respectively.
The transmitted signal x is then determined by
x =
√
|m|2 + |t|2, (2)
where m ∈ M = {mi|i = 1, · · · , Lm} and t ∈ T =
{ti,j|i = 1, · · · , Lm; j = 1, · · · , Lt}. Lm and Lt are
the number of constellation points of message signal and
tag signal, respectively. The transmitted signal that involves
message signal mi is denoted as xi. The average power of
message signal Em and the average power of tag signal Et
are constrained by the total average system power Etot
Em + Et ≤ Etot, (3)
where Em =
1
Lm
Lm∑
i=1
|mi|
2 and Et =
1
LmLt
Lm∑
i=1
Lt∑
j=1
|ti,j |
2. The
received signal y at the controller in the considered massive
SIMO system can be represented by
y = hx+ n, (4)
where h = [h1, · · · , hN ]
T is the SIMO channel vector and
n = [n1, · · · , nN ]
T is the noise vector between the sensor
and controller. We assume that h is a circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian random vector, specifically, each element of
h is independently and identically distributed with zero mean
and unit variance (i.e., Rayleigh fading). Another assumption
is that n is a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random
vector which is independent of h. The mean vector of n is a
zero vector and its covariance matrix is σ2IN . σ
2 is assumed
to be known and IN is an N -dimensional unit matrix.
Two steps are required in the signal detection at the receiver
side. First, following the ML detection rule, the estimated
message signal mˆ is obtained by solving the problem
mˆ = argmax
m∈M
f(y|m), (5)
where f(y|m) is the probability density function (PDF) of
y conditioned on m. Second, the estimated tag signal tˆ is
obtained based on mˆ with the ML rule,
tˆ = argmax
t∈T
f(y|mˆ, t), (6)
where f(y|mˆ, t) is the PDF of y conditioned on mˆ and t.
After the detection, we can get the estimated message bits
b′ and the estimated MAC M ′ with the demodulation of mˆ
and tˆ, respectively. Then a new MACMn is calculated with b
′
and k by the same hash function, i.e., Mn = hash(b
′, k). The
authentication process is completed by comparing M ′ with
Mn. IfM
′ andMn are identical, the message can be regraded
as coming from a legitimate user1 and not being tampered
with. Otherwise, this message will be discarded because it is
not authenticated successfully.
III. PRELIMINARIES AND DETECTION RULES
In this section, we first introduce preliminaries on non-
negative PAM design for message constellation in the massive
SIMO system, and then present the 1-bit tag embedding design
when the message constellation points are given.
A. Preliminaries on Message Constellation Design
We now consider only a message signal m ∈ M is
transmitted. The problem (5) has been solved in [8], which
showed that the ML detection problem can be solved by
a quantization operation. More specifically, the quantization
operation is described as [8]
mˆ =


m1, if
||y||2
N
< B1;
mi, if Bi−1 ≤
||y||2
N
≤ Bi, i = 2, · · · , Lm − 1;
mLm , if
||y||2
N
> BLm−1,
(7)
where Bi is the optimal decision threshold between mi and
mi+1. The threshold Bi can be represented by
Bi =
AiAi+1 ln
Ai+1
Ai
Ai+1 −Ai
, i = 1, ..., Lm − 1, (8)
where Ai = |mi|
2 + σ2. Based on this optimal decision rule,
the correct detection probability of i-th symbol mi, denoted
by Pc,i, is determined by [8]
Pc,i =


G
(
NBi
Ai
)
, if i = 1;
G
(
NBi
Ai
)
−G
(
NBi−1
Ai
)
, if i = 2, · · · , Lm − 1;
1−G
(
NBLm−1
Ai
)
, if i = Lm,
(9)
where G(z) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
a complex Chi-squared distribution variable Z , given by
G(z) = 1− e−z
N−1∑
L=0
zL
L!
, z > 0. (10)
1Note that time stamps or session identifiers are required to resist replay
attacks.
When each message symbol is selected from M with equal
probability, the average message symbol error rate (SER),
denoted by Pe, can be calculated as follows:
Pe = 1−
1
Lm
Lm∑
i=1
Pc,i. (11)
By minimizing Pe under the constraint that average message
power is not greater than Em, the asymptotically optimal non-
negative PAM constellation design for massive SIMO systems
can be represented as follows [8]:{
0, σ2(R− 1), σ2(R2 − 1), · · · , σ2(RLm−1 − 1)
}
, (12)
where R (R > 1) is obtained by solving the equation
Lm−1∑
j=0
Rj = Lm
(
Em
σ2
+ 1
)
. (13)
The message signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), denoted by γm, is
defined as γm =
Em
σ2
. The constellation points are described
from the perspective of power since there is a specific cor-
respondence between power and amplitude in non-negative
PAM. Take Lm = 4 as an example, the message constellation
points described with Ai and the corresponding decision
thresholds Bi are shown in Fig. 2(a).
B. Tag Embedding Design
We are now ready to elaborate the proposed tag embedding
scheme and the corresponding detection rule. One-bit embed-
ding is considered in this paper, i.e., Lt = 2. When the i-th
message symbol is transmitted, the power of the embedded
symbol Ei,j has two possible values according to two different
tag bits,
Ei,j =
{
|mi|
2 + |ti,1|
2, if j = 1 (tag bit is 0);
|mi|
2 + |ti,2|
2, if j = 2 (tag bit is 1).
(14)
Note that the power of tag signal ti,1 and ti,2 are variables
depending on message signal mi, which is the key idea of
the proposed “Message-based Tag Modulation”. In existing
methods that use uniform tag embedding, ti,1 and ti,2 are con-
stants for different message signal mi. The reason we do not
use uniform tag embedding is that the message constellation
points in our method contain the relationship of geometric
series as shown in Fig. 2(a). If ti,1 and ti,2 are high power tag
signals, they may be suitable for signal points A3 and A4, but
will not work well for A1 and A2, and vice versa. Due to the
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(b) Tag Embedding design and updated decision thresholds.
Fig. 2. Signal design and decision thresholds.
effect of the embedding tag, the message decision thresholds
(8) need to be updated. We also take Lm = 4 as an example to
show the tag embedding design and the corresponding decision
thresholds in Fig. 2(b). Since the message constellation points
that are close to each other are more error-prone, we use the
nearest two constellation points to calculate the new message
decision threshold B′i by (8),
B′i =
Ai,2Ai+1,1 ln
Ai+1,1
Ai,2
Ai+1,1 −Ai,2
, i = 1, · · · , Lm − 1, (15)
where Ai,j = Ei,j + σ
2. Using (7) and (15), the message
symbol can be estimated, which is the first step of the
detection. Based on the result of estimated message symbol,
tag symbol is detected subsequently with the following rule,
tˆ =
{
ti,1(tag bit is 0), if
||y||2
N
≤ Ci;
ti,2(tag bit is 1), if
||y||2
N
> Ci;
(16)
where Ci is the optimal decision threshold to decide which tag
bit is embedded in message signal mi. Since (8) also follows
the general form of non-coherent ML decision threshold, Ci
can be expressed as
Ci =
Ai,1Ai,2 ln
Ai,2
Ai,1
Ai,2 −Ai,1
, i = 1, 2, · · · , Lm. (17)
Note that the instantaneous CSI is not required in message
detector (7) and tag detector (16). As such, successive interfer-
ence cancellation (SIC) detection widely used in existing PLA
methods is no longer applicable in this method. According to
the constellation design results of Section III-A, the optimal
power of first constellation point is zero. Therefore, we can
set the power of the tag signal to zero when tag bit is 0, i.e.,
|ti,1|
2 = 0 (for i = 1, · · · , Lm).
IV. ERROR PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND OPTIMIZATION
In this section, the message SER and tag SER are analyzed
first as the performance metrics of the proposed PLA method.
Then the optimization problem of signal design is formulated
and solved according to the specific system requirements.
A. Error Performance Analysis
According to the assumptions of h and n in Section II, y is
also a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random vector.
The mean vector of y is a zero vector, and its covariance
matrix can be written as
E
[
yy
H
]
= E
[(
h
√
|m|2 + |t|2 + n
)(
h
√
|m|2 + |t|2 + n
)H]
=
(
|m|2 + |t|2 + σ2
)
IN .
(18)
Define a new random variable Z ′
Z ′ =
||y||2
|m|2 + |t|2 + σ2
, (19)
which follows complex Chi-squared distribution. When m1 is
transmitted with embedding tag t1,1, according to (7) and (15),
the message signal can be correctly detected if
||y||2
N
< B′1.
This condition is equivalent to
||y||2
|m1|2 + |t1,1|2 + σ2
<
NB′1
|m1|2 + |t1,1|2 + σ2
=
NB′1
A1,1
. (20)
Let Pcm,i denote the average correct message detection prob-
ability of xi. Then Pcm,1 can be derived as
Pcm,1 = G
(
NB′1
A1,1
)
. (21)
Similarly, Pcm,i can be given by
Pcm,i =


1
2
2∑
j=1
G
(
NB′i
Ai,j
)
, if i=1;
1
2
2∑
j=1
[
G
(
NB′i
Ai,j
)
−G
(
NB′i−1
Ai,j
)]
, if i=2, · · · , Lm− 1;
1
2
2∑
j=1
[
1−G
(
NB′Lm−1
Ai,j
)]
, if i=Lm.
(22)
The average message SER Pem can be calculated as
Pem = 1−
1
Lm
Lm∑
i=1
Pcm,i. (23)
The assumption is made that the message symbols are selected
from constellation points collection with equal probability.
Due to the uniformity characteristic of hash functions, dif-
ferent tag bits can also be considered appearing with equal
probability [15].
We now consider the error performance of the tag signal.
Suitable hash functions exhibit “avalanche effect”, i.e., the
output changes significantly if the input alters slightly [15].
The authentication fails when the message estimation has
only one bit error, which indicates that the recalculated MAC
will be meaningless if the message parts have errors. As
a result, we consider the tag SER under the condition that
the message symbol is detected correctly. It should be noted
that the message SER can be controlled to be low enough
(e.g. less than 10−5) during the embedding design process.
Therefore, in this paper, the tag correct rate and error rate
are calculated from the perspective of conditional probability.
When the embedded symbol xi is transmitted, the tag correct
detection rate under the condition that the message symbolmi
is correctly obtained can be determined by (16), which is
Pct,i =
1
2
[
G
(
NCi
Ai,1
)
+ 1−G
(
NCi
Ai,2
)]
. (24)
To simplify the expression, we define the proportional
variables ri(i = 1, · · · , Lm)
ri =
Ai,2
Ai,1
, 1 < ri < R. (25)
Therefore, the average tag SER, denoted by Pet, can be
represented by
Pet =
1
Lm
Lm∑
i=1
(1− Pct,i)
=
1
2Lm
Lm∑
i=1
[1 +G (Nu(ri))−G (Nv(ri))] ,
(26)
where u(ri) =
ln ri
ri−1
and v(ri) =
ri ln ri
ri−1
.
B. Trade-off Characterization
One primary purpose of this paper is to design an optimal
embedding scheme to minimize the tag SER subject to the total
average power constraint. Meanwhile, the system reliability
should meet the certain requirement, i.e., Pem < δ, where δ
is the message SER requirement threshold. This optimization
problem is formulated as follows
min
{Ai,j}
j=1,2
i=1,··· ,Lm
Pet (27a)
s.t. Et + Em ≤ Etot, (27b)
Pem ≤ δ. (27c)
This problem is non-trivial because of multiple optimization
variables and the complex structure of constraint functions.
To simplify this problem, we use two steps to solve it. First,
we find the optimal tag embedding scheme when the message
constellation is fixed (i.e., Em is given). Second, we search for
the optimal allocated power of message Em that can minimize
the tag SER.
Now we consider the first step. When Em is fixed, the
message SER Pem and the tag SER Pet are given by (23)
and (26), respectively. Note that Pem is complicated since it
contains multiple variables (Ai,j , i = 1, · · · , Lm, j = 1 or 2).
To reduce the complexity of constraint (27c), an upper bound
of message SER, Puem, can be derived to replace Pem in (27c).
The upper bound can be derived as follows
P
u
em =
1
Lm
Lm−1∑
i=1
{1−G [Ng(ri)] +G [Nh(ri)]} , (28)
where g(ri) =
R ln R
ri
R−ri
, h(ri) =
ri ln
R
ri
R−ri
. The proof is provided
in Appendix A.
Using variable substitution ri = e
ki(0 < ki < lnR) and the
message SER upper bound in (28), the optimization problem
(27) can be rewritten as
min
{ki}
Lm
i=1
1
2Lm
Lm∑
i=1
{
1 +G
[
Nu(eki)
]
−G
[
Nv(eki)
]}
(29a)
s.t.
1
2Lm
Lm∑
i=1
Ai,1(e
ki − 1) ≤ Etot − Em, (29b)
1
Lm
Lm−1∑
i=1
{
1−G
[
Ng(eki)
]
+G
[
Nh(eki)
]}
≤ δ. (29c)
We can show that (36) is a convex optimization problem and
the proof is provided in Appendix B. Therefore (36) can be
efficiently solved by interior-point method and the optimal tag
embedding scheme can be determined when Em is given.
In the second step, we consider the situation when Em is
a variable, different Em results in different values of Pet. In
this case, the optimization result of (36) is a function of Em,
which is denoted byH(Em). Note that whenH(Em) achieves
its minimal value, the inequality (27b) will become a equality,
i.e., Em + Et = Etot. The reason is that if Etot still has a
surplus, Pem and Pet can be further reduced by increasing
message and tag power at the same time. Therefore, this
optimization problem can be narrated as finding the optimal
power allocation between message signal and tag signal when
the constraints are still satisfied. Define the power allocation
factor α,
α =
Em
Etot
, α0 ≤ α ≤ 1, (30)
where α0 is the minimum factor that makes Em satisfy the
constraint Puem ≤ δ. The function H(Em) can be represented
by H(α), which indicates that different α corresponds to
different minimized tag SER. Therefore, the new power al-
location problem can be formulated as
min
α0≤α≤1
H(α) (31a)
s.t. Et ≤ (1− α)Etot, (31b)
P
u
e,m ≤ δ. (31c)
This is a problem of single variable with a limited range, which
can be efficiently solved by one-dimensional search.
When we set different values of message SER requirement
threshold δ for the considered system, different minimized tag
SER can be obtained by solving the optimization problem
(27). Therefore, we can characterize the trade-off between the
message and tag error performance through changing the value
of the message SER requirement thresholds.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We carried out computer simulations to verify the theoretical
results. In our simulations, we set N = 128 and σ2 = 1.
Firstly, to show the accuracy of the message and tag error
performance analysis, the theoretical and simulation results
of Pem and Pet are demonstrated in Fig. 3 and they match
with each other. Etot is set to be large enough because
optimization has not yet been considered. The “Message-
based Tag Modulation” scheme is compared with the “Uniform
Embedding” scheme that embeds same tag power levels for
all message symbols. For a fair comparison, we control the tag
power of two embedding schemes to make sure they have the
same message SER performance (i.e., less than 10−5) when
the message SNR is 10dB. The results show that the tag SER
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Fig. 3. Comparison of SER of the proposed embedding scheme and uniform
embedding scheme.
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Fig. 4. Optimization results of tag SER with different Etot.
of the proposed embedding scheme decreases as the message
SNR increases. However, the tag SER of the “Uniform Em-
bedding” scheme is always above 90%. Therefore, “Uniform
Embedding” scheme is not suitable for PLA in non-coherent
massive SIMO communications.
Then we focus on the optimal performance by solving
optimization problems in Section IV-B. The message SER
upper bound threshold δ is set to 10−5. The results of
optimization problem (36) and the search results for power
allocation are provided in Fig. 4. The tag SER decreases as the
total system average power increases and the optimal power
allocation factor can be found from the results.
Finally, to understand the entire system performance, the
trade-off between Pem and Pet is depicted in Fig. 5. We can
observe from the trade-off curves that the tag SER decreases as
the message SER requirement threshold increases. The results
in Fig. 5 also show that both tag SER and message SER can
be reduced when the total system average power increases.
The trade-off curve presents the optimal tag SER performance
under different system requirements for message SER, which
can provide useful insights for practical PLA system design.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed an active PLA mechanism
for non-coherent massive SIMO-based IIoT systems. This
paper is the first to show that active PLA can be achieved
without the need of pilot signal and channel estimation. We
designed the optimal tag embedding scheme when the message
constellation is given. Then we solved the power allocation
problem to obtain the optimal tag SER performance. The
trade-off curve between tag SER and message SER was
depicted to offer a comprehensive understanding of the system
performance. From the simulation results, we can conclude
that “Message-based Tag Modulation” is necessary for the
considered non-coherent system. Moreover, the proposed au-
thentication method can meet the specific power and error
rate requirements of IIoT system. As an initial effort, the tag
embedding design was limited to 1-bit tag per message symbol
in this paper. We will extend our work to multiple bits tag per
message symbol for future work.
10-6 10-5 10-4 10-3
Message symbol error rate
10-7
10-6
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
T
a
g
 s
y
m
b
o
l 
e
rr
o
r 
ra
te
Etot=14dB
Etot=15dB
Etot=16dB
Etot=17dB
Fig. 5. Trade-off curves of tag SER and message SER with different Etot.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF AN UPPER BOUND OF THE MESSAGE SER
Notice that the average message SER of x1 is less than
transmitting
√
m12 + t1,2
2, because close constellation points
produce a large message SER. Let Pem,i denote the average
message SER when mi is transmitted. Pem,1 and its upper
bound can be derived as follows
Pem,1 =
1
2
[
P
(
mˆ = m2, · · · , mLm |x1 =
√
m12 + t1,12
)
+ P
(
mˆ = m2, · · · ,mLm |x1 =
√
m12 + t1,22
)]
< P
(
mˆ = m2, · · · ,mLm |x1 =
√
m12 + t1,22
)
= 1−G
(
NB′1
A1,2
)
.
(32)
Similarly, the average message SER of xLm is less than
transmitting
√
mLm
2 + tLm,1
2, so the upper bound of Pem,Lm
can be derived as follows
Pem,Lm < P
(
mˆ = m1, · · · , mLm−1|xLm =
√
mLm
2 + tLm,1
2
)
= G
(
NB′Lm−1
ALm,1
)
.
(33)
Further, the average message SER of xi(i = 2, · · · , Lm − 1)
also has an upper bound due to the same reason above,
Pem,i < P
(
mˆ = m1, · · · ,mi−1|xi =
√
mi2 + ti,12
)
+ P
(
mˆ = mi+1, · · · ,mLm |xi =
√
mi2 + ti,22
)
= 1−G
(
NB′i
Ai,2
)
+G
(
NB′i−1
Ai,1
)
.
(34)
From the above, an upper bound of Pem can be derived as
Pem =
1
Lm
Lm∑
i=1
Pem,i
<
1
Lm
Lm−1∑
i=1
[
1−G
(
NB′i
Ai,2
)
+G
(
NB′i
Ai+1,1
)]
=
1
Lm
Lm−1∑
i=1
{1−G [Ng(ri)] +G [Nh(ri)]} ,
(35)
where g(ri) =
R ln R
ri
R−ri
, h(ri) =
ri ln
R
ri
R−ri
. This completes the
proof of an upper bound of the message SER.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THE CONVEX OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
The considered optimization problem is rewritten as fol-
lows:
min
{ki}
Lm
i=1
1
2Lm
Lm∑
i=1
{
1 +G
[
Nu(eki)
]
−G
[
Nv(eki)
]}
(36a)
s.t.
1
2Lm
Lm∑
i=1
Ai,1(e
ki − 1) ≤ Etot − Em, (36b)
1
Lm
Lm−1∑
i=1
{
1−G
[
Ng(eki)
]
+G
[
Nh(eki)
]}
≤ δ. (36c)
Let F (k) = 1 + G
[
Nu(ek)
]
− G
[
Nv(ek)
]
and W (k) =
1−G
[
Ng(ek)
]
+G
[
Nh(ek)
]
.
F (k) is a convex function for 0 < k < lnR according
to the lemma in [8]. The objective function in (36a) is a
sum of Lm convex functions F (ki)(i = 1, · · · , Lm) and its
Hessian matrix is a diagonal matrix, thus the Hessian matrix
is positive definite and the objective function in (36a) is a
convex function. Note that ek − 1 is a basic convex function.
The left side of (36b) is a sum of Lm convex functions
eki − 1(i = 1, · · · , Lm) and its Hessian matrix is a diagonal
matrix, so it is also a convex function. The left side of (36c)
is a sum of Lm − 1 functions W (ki)(i = 1, · · · , Lm − 1)
and its Hessian matrix is a diagonal matrix. Therefore, the
optimization problem (36) is a convex problem if W (k) is a
convex function for 0 < k < lnR.
LetW1(k) = G
[
Ng(ek)
]
andW2(k) = G
[
Nh(ek)
]
. Then
we have W ′(k) =W ′2(k)−W
′
1(k). The derivative of G(z) is
fZ(z) =
1
(N−1)!z
N−1e−z . Then we have
W
′
1(k) = fZ
[
Ng(ek)
]
Ng
′(ek)
=
1
(N − 1)!
[
Ng(ek)
]N−1
e
−Ng(ek)
Ng
′(ek).
(37)
Since h(ek) = g(ek) e
k
R
= g(ek) + (k − lnR), we can obtain
that h′(ek) = 1
R
ek
[
g(ek) + g′(ek)
]
. Then we have
W
′
2(k) = fZ
[
Nh(ek)
]
Nh
′(ek)
=
1
(N − 1)!
[
Nh(ek)
]N−1
· e−Nh(e
k)
Nh
′(ek)
=
1
(N − 1)!
[
Ng(ek)
ek
R
]N−1
· e−N[g(e
k)+(k−lnR)]
·N
{
1
R
e
k
[
g(ek) + g′(ek)
]}
= W ′1(k) +
1
(N − 1)!
N
N
g(ek)Ne−Ng(e
k)
.
(38)
Therefore, we can simplify the W ′(k) as follows
W
′(k) =
1
(N − 1)!
N
N
g(ek)Ne−Ng(e
k)
. (39)
The second-order derivative of W (k) can be obtained by
W
′′(k) =
NN+1g(ek)N−1e−Ng(e
k)g′(ek)
[
1− g(ek)
]
(N − 1)!
, (40)
where
g
′(ek) =
R
[
ek −R + ek(lnR − k)
]
(R− ek)2
r=ek
=
Rr
(R− r)2
(1 + ln
R
r
−
R
r
).
(41)
Since lnx−x is a monotonically decreasing function for x >
1, then we have 1 + ln R
r
− R
r
< 0. Therefore, g′(ek) < 0
for 0 < k < lnR. Then we know that g(ek) is a decreasing
function when 0 < k < lnR. Moreover, limk→lnR g(e
k) = 1,
then 1 − g(ek) < 0 for 0 < k < lnR. We can conclude that
W ′′(k) > 0(0 < k < lnR), thus W (k) is a convex function
for 0 < k < lnR. Above all, the optimization problem (36)
is a convex problem.
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